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DIGNITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE: A
SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE*
CHIEF JUSTICE ARTHUR CHASKALSON**
[This paper is based off of a lecture entitled "Dignity as a
Constitutional Value: A South African Perspective, " given at the
Washington College of Law on October 4, 2010. Commentaries by
Professors Frank Michelman and Herman Schwartz were given in
response to the lecture, and are presented here as well.]
The first section of the South African Constitution sets out the
founding values of the post-apartheid state. They include human
dignity, the achievement of equality, and the advancement of human
rights and freedoms. It is not surprising that these values should be
the foundations of the new constitutional order.
Apartheid was the culmination of a process of racial
discrimination and white supremacy which had been in place for
three centuries. It began under colonialism and was entrenched when
Blacks, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the
population, were denied political franchise by the Imperial
Parliament when it established its new dominion.
Whites used their political and economic power to further their
dominant social, economic and political position. Under apartheid
this process deepened. At that time, the doctrine of the supremacy of
parliament, a principle of English law later entrenched in the South
African constitution by the apartheid government, was applied by our
courts.' Its impact can best be described by a passage from a 1934
* I would like to thank my research assistants, Omer Duru and Catherine
Davies, for their assistance in the preparation of this paper.
** President of the Constitutional Court of South Africa (1994-2001) and
Chief Justice of South Africa (2001-2005).
1. See PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: A
COMMONWEALTH APPROACH 7 (John Hatchard & Peter Slinn eds., 1999)
(characterizing South Africa's apartheid-era version of the "Westminster model of
parliamentary sovereignty" to be a "rubber stamp of a tyrannical executive" which
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judgment of the Appellate Division, then the highest court, where the
Chief Justice of that time said "Parliament may make any
encroachment it chooses upon the life, liberty, or property of any
individual subject to its sway . .. and it is the function of the courts
of law to enforce its will." 2
This was done as a matter of course under apartheid. Over 80% of
the land was set aside exclusively for ownership and occupation by
whites, who then constituted less than 20% of the population. The
majority of the black population was required to live in
overpopulated, underdeveloped and impoverished homelands
established in the rest of the country, and it was an offence for them
to leave the homeland without a permit. Segregation was enforced in
almost all spheres of life. The government passed laws denying
blacks access to proper education, restricting their mobility, and their
right to live and work in most of the country, other than as migrant
labourers on white-owned farms or in menial positions in the white
controlled commercial and industrial sector. Those permitted to live
in the so-called "white areas" were forced into segregated,
underdeveloped, and overcrowded ghettoes in urban areas, or into
single-sex hostels near the places where they worked. Although they
were the great majority of the population, blacks were voteless,
landless and impoverished.'
Despite the massive power of the state, there was an ongoing and
intense struggle against apartheid. Draconian security laws were
passed to counter this resistance, but the struggle continued, and
many died or were imprisoned during its course. The first step
towards what was to become a police state in South Africa was taken
in 1950 with the passing of the Suppression of Communism Act.4
Various statutory offences relating to communism were created,
including the offence of performing any act which was calculated to
further the achievement of any of the objects of communism or
advocating, advising, defending or encouraging the achievement of
failed to protect the people from unjust laws).
2. Sachs v. Minister of Justice 1934 A.D. 11 (A) at 37 (S. Afr.).
3. For an account of the impact of apartheid on day-to-day life, see generally
ANTHONY SAMPSON, MANDELA: THE AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY (1999); LEONARD
THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA (3d ed. 2000).
4. Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950 (S. Afr.).
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any such object, or any such act.' "Communism" was defined in the
Suppression of Communism Act in a way that may possibly have
included what Marx and Lenin contemplated, but it also had a sting
in the tail. According to the definition, communism included any
scheme which aimed at bringing about any political, industrial, social
or economic change within South Africa by unlawful acts or
omissions.6 The law was written to mean that any political action the
white legislature had decided, or might in the future decide, to be
unlawful would amount to communism. To counter passive
resistance, a law was later passed making it a special offence to
contravene a law by protesting against it or any other law, punishable
by harsh penalties including flogging.'
In 1960, the Unlawful Organizations Act was passed to empower
the government to declare organizations other than the so-called
"communist organizations" to be unlawful, and to extend the
criminal sanctions of the Suppression of Communism Act to such
groups.! The African National Congress and other anti-apartheid
organizations, which until then had been at the forefront of non-
violent opposition to apartheid, were banned, and it became an
offence to belong to such organizations or to further their objects.
Political rhetoric set the scene for this and for the draconian
security legislation that followed. The white voters were warned that
the state was facing a total onslaught. They were told that the
legislation was not directed against law abiding citizens and would
not affect them. The targets were communists and terrorists.
Detention without trial was introduced, the police were empowered
to hold detainees incommunicado, and to deny them access to their
lawyers or own medical advisors. 9 Initially detention was for 90
days, then for 180 days, and then indefinitely. 10 Courts were stripped
of their jurisdiction to make habeas corpus orders in respect of
5. Id. § 1(a)-11(b).
6. Id. § 1(ii)(b).
7. Criminal Law Amendment Act 8 of 1953 (S. Afr.).
8. Unlawful Organizations Act 34 of 1960 (S. Aft.).
9. General Laws Amendment Act 37 of 1963 § 17 (S. Afr.).
10. See generally General Laws Amendment Act 37 of 1963 (S. Afr.) (setting
detention without trial at ninety days); Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 96 of
1965 (S. Afr.) (setting detention without trial at 180 days); General Laws
Amendment Act 83 of 1967 (S. Afr.) (allowing for indefinite detention without
trial as part of the Terrorism Act).
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detainees." The isolation of the detainees and the ousting of the
jurisdiction of the courts led to torture and other abuses. Censorship
was introduced, newspapers aimed at the black community were
banned, and in the 1980s a state of emergency was declared which
allowed the security forces vast discretionary powers. But the
resistance to apartheid continued within South Africa, with
increasing support from the international community, including the
imposition of economic and other sanctions.12 There were
widespread strikes and protests within South Africa, and the jails
were filled with political prisoners. Ultimately, the conflict was
brought to an end by a negotiated settlement, but it left in its wake a
severely damaged economy, a fragmented and traumatized society,
poverty, underdevelopment, and corruption.
It was in these circumstances that we adopted our new
constitutional order. There is not time tonight to tell the story of how
that was done and the processes that were followed. The outcome,
however, was the Constitution of 1996.11 The Constitution refers to
the Bill of Rights as "a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa
[which] enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms
the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom".14 In
addition to their inclusion in the founding values of the new state,
dignity, equality and freedom are entrenched as separate and discrete
rights in the Bill of Rights, and have a special role in its
interpretation and application." The Constitution instructs courts to
interpret the bill of rights so as to promote the values that underlie
"an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality
11. See General Laws Amendment Act 37 of 1963 § 17(3) (S. Afr.); see also
Schermbrucker v Klindt, N. 0. 1965 (4) SA 606 (A) (S. Afr.) (holding that the
court was unable to intervene in an application in which it was alleged by a
detainee in a note smuggled out of prison that he was being tortured).
12. See, e.g., Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, Pub. L. No. 99-440, H.R.
4868 (1986) (imposing economic sanctions on U.S.-South African trade and
investment, and catalyzing similar sanctions by other nations, including Japan and
many European nations).
13. The Constitution making process was undertaken in two stages. First, an
interim Constitution was adopted in 2003 to prepare for the adoption of a
Constitution by an elected Constitutional Assembly. See generally HASSEN
EBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A NATION: CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA
(1998).
14. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 7(1).
15. Id. §§ 8, 9, 12.
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and freedom"."6 The entrenched rights may be limited," but the
standard prescribed by the Constitution is that this may be done only
"in terms of law of general application to the extent that the
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.""
The centrality of these values is captured by Justice O'Regan in
her concurring judgment in the capital punishment case, where the
Constitutional Court, now the highest court in South Africa,
unanimously held that capital punishment was inconsistent with our
constitution." "No-one," she said, "could miss the significance of the
hermeneutic standard set. The values urged upon the court are not
those that have informed our past. Our history is one of repression
not freedom, oligarchy not democracy, apartheid and prejudice not
equality, clandestine not open government."2 0 And she went on to
say that
Respect for the dignity of all human beings is particularly important in
South Africa. For apartheid was a denial of a common humanity. Black
people were refused respect and dignity and thereby the dignity of all
South Africans was diminished. The new Constitution rejects this past
and affirms the equal worth of all South Africans. Thus recognition and
protection is the touchstone of the new political order and is fundamental
to the new Constitution.21
Some constitutional scholars reject the concept of dignity as a
constitutional value, considering it to be "a vacuous concept ...
without bounds," too uncertain to have a clear meaning, and "little
function beyond the polemical."22 Others, Justice Brennan was one, 23
16. Id. § 36(1).
17. Id. § 7(3).
18. Id. § 36(1).
19. See State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
20. Id. at 176 para. 322-23 (O'Regan, J., concurring) ("In interpreting the rights
enshrined in chapter 3, therefore, the court is directed to the future: to the ideal of a
new society which is built on the common values which made a political transition
possible in our country and which are the foundation of its new constitution.").
21. Id. at 19 para. 329.
22. See Mirko Bagaric & James Allan, The Vacuous Concept of Dignity, 5 J.
HUM. RTs., 257, 268 (2006).
23. See generally Stephen J. Wermiel, Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial
Soul of Justice Brennan, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223 (1998) (examining the
role of Supreme Court Justice Brennan in establishing the concept of human
2011] 138 1
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consider dignity to be a fundamental value crucial to the meaning
and development of constitutional rights. This is not a debate for
South African lawyers and judges. Respect for human dignity as a
foundational value is entrenched in specific terms in our
Constitution, and lawyers and judges cannot dismiss that as a
vacuous concept; they have to give effect to the Constitutional
mandate, and give meaning to its language. Acknowledging that
dignity is a difficult concept to capture in precise terms, the
Constitutional Court has held that the constitutional protection of
dignity requires us at the least "to acknowledge the value and worth
of all individuals as members of our society"2 4 and to treat all with
"equal respect and concern."" Building on that has given dignity a
central role in the Court's evolving jurisprudence.
The affirmation of dignity as a foundational value of the South
African constitutional order was not a romantic extravagance. To the
contrary, it placed our legal order firmly in line with the development
of constitutionalism in the aftermath of the Second World War. The
three core international human rights instruments which laid the
foundations of the international human rights order, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic,
Cultural and Social Rights all assert that rights to be respected and to
be upheld in terms of these instruments "derive from the inherent
dignity of the human person."2 6 And this is repeated in the many
international human rights Conventions that were subsequently
adopted. 27
dignity as an essential component of human rights formulation).
24. Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA
6 (CC) at 30 para. 28 (S. Afr.).
25. Id. at 131 para. 134 (Sachs, J., concurring); see also State v. Makwanyane
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 179 para. 328 (O'Regan, J., concurring) (S. Afr.) ("The
importance of dignity as a founding value of the new Constitution cannot be
overemphasised. Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the
intrinsic worth of human beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy
of respect and concern.").
26. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A (1II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
27. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-22,
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Article 1 of the Basic Rights in the German Constitution provides
that "[h]uman dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it
shall be the duty of all state authority." 28 The basic rights of the
German Constitution are all interpreted and applied by the German
Federal Constitutional Court in the context of this central value, and
the decisions of the German courts provide a prodigious
jurisprudence of dignity.29 The European Court of Human Rights has
said that respect for human dignity and freedom is the very essence
of the European Convention on Human Rights, which applies
throughout Europe.3 0
Dignity is not spelt out in the Canadian or Indian Constitutions.
Yet the Canadian Supreme Court has said that the genesis of the
rights and freedoms in the Canadian Charter of Rights include
"respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,"31 and that the
idea of dignity finds expression in almost every right and freedom
guaranteed by the Charter.3 2 In India, the highly respected Supreme
Court has held that the "right to life includes the right to live with
human dignity and all that goes along with it; .. . [that] [e]very act
which offends against or impairs human dignity would Constitute
deprivation pro tanto of this right to live, and ... would have to be
[justified] in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure
established by law which stands the test of other fundamental
1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14;
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
pmbl., Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Rights of the Child
pmbl., Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006).
28. GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ]
[GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949 art. 1(1) (Ger.).
29. The role played by human dignity in German jurisprudence is discussed by
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
314-16 (1994); see also DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY Ch. 7 (2d ed. 1997);
Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and
American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 963; George P. Fletcher,
Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, 22 U. W. ONTARIO L. REV. 171 (1984).
30. S.W. v. United Kingdom, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 28, para. 44 (1995).
31. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, para. 64 (Can.).
32. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 164-77 (Can.); see also Kindler v.




There have been references to dignity in some of the judgments of
the United States Supreme Court, particularly from Justice Brennan,
who gave it considerable weight in his judgments on capital
punishment.3 4 A plurality of the Court in Casey v. Planned
Parenthood held that "choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."3 5 The Supreme Court has also held dignity to be
central to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments.3 6 More recently, in Roper v. Simmons, Justice
Kennedy, writing for a plurality, described the Constitution as resting
on "principles original to the American experience such as
federalism; a proven balance in political mechanisms through
separation of powers; specific guarantees for the accused in criminal
cases; and broad provisions to secure individual freedom and
preserve human dignity." 7 These doctrines and guarantees are
central to the American experience and remain essential to our
present-day self-definition and national identity.
In extra-curial speeches Justice Brennan described dignity as being
the foundation of the U.S. Constitution and its Bill of Rights, 38 but
the centrality of dignity to the adjudication of rights does not form
part of the broad jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court.
The perspective from South Africa to which I now turn may possibly
33. See Francis Coralie Mullin v. Adm'r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2
S.C.R. 516, 518 (India).
34. See Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1080 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (characterizing the death penalty as "uniquely
degrading to human dignity that, when combined with the arbitrariness by which
capital punishment is imposed, the trend of enlightened opinion, and the
availability of less severe penological alternatives, the death penalty is always
unconstitutional") (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287-291 (1972)).
35. 505 U.S. 833, 923 (1992).
36. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) ("The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While
the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power
be exercised within the limits of civilized standards."); see also Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the
government to respect the dignity of all persons.").
37. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
38. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REv. 433, 439 (1986).
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sound strange to a United States audience, though it may have a
greater resonance with audiences in other parts of the world.
I referred earlier to the core foundational values of our
Constitution: dignity, equality and freedom. For many constitutional
scholars there is a tension between liberty and equality. Taken to
their extremes this is no doubt so. But this tension is not an obstacle
to interpretation if each is seen as having its origin in respect for
human dignity, and to reflect different aspects of it. The
Constitutional Court gives equal weight to all three values. 9 This
involves the weighing up of different values, and ultimately an
assessment based on proportionality. 40 Through the influence of
dignity, the values of liberty and equality are harmonized, and taken
together the three values have provided a coherent foundation for the
South African Constitutional Court's jurisprudence. These core
values, given content by the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights
and other provisions of the Constitution, provide an objective
normative value system according to which South African courts are
required to interpret the Constitution and develop the law.4 1
The influence of dignity is apparent in the Court's approach to
equality and discrimination. A right to equality before the law and
the equal protection of the law is entrenched in our Constitution,4 2
which goes on to provide that
Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.
To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures
39. See State v. Mamabolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) at 37 para. 41 (S. Afr.)
(upholding the offense of 'scandalising the court' as a means of limiting the right
to freedom of expression in order to protect the dignity and integrity of the
judiciary in certain narrowly defined cases). "[T]he Constitution . . . proclaims
three conjoined, reciprocal and covalent values to be foundational to the Republic:
human dignity, equality and freedom. With us the right to freedom of expression
cannot be said automatically to trump the right to human dignity."
40. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 69 para. 104 (S. Afr.); see
also Brink v. Kitshoff 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) at 25 para. 46 (S. Afr.) (holding that
it is now "well-established" that a proportionality test must be used by the Court to
weigh the "purpose and effects of infringing provisions" against "the nature and
extent of the infringement caused.").
41. See Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 33
para. 54 (S. Afr.) (emphasizing that the South African Constitution embodies an
"objective normative value system" which must be used to develop and shape the
common law).
42. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 9(1).
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designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.43
This is followed by specific anti-discrimination provisions which
prohibit unfair discrimination directly or indirectly by the state or
any person on one or more of the grounds of " race, gender, sex,
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
language and birth."44
Recognizing that differences in approaches to equality taken by
courts in different national jurisdictions arise not only from different
texts and different histories, but also from "different jurisprudential
and philosophical understandings of equality," 45 the South African
Constitutional Court has made clear that it considers equality to have
a substantive content.4 6 In doing so, it has taken a path similar to that
taken by the Canadian Supreme Court.47 In an early decision dealing
with discrimination, the Constitutional Court recalled that
We are emerging from a period of our history during which the humanity
of the majority of the inhabitants of this country was denied. They were
treated as not having inherent worth; as objects whose identities could be
arbitrarily defined by those in power rather than as persons of infinite
worth. In short, they were denied recognition of their inherent dignity. 48
This was the essence of the discrimination which so many had
suffered in our country. We had lived through it. The wounds were
fresh. We understood from our own experience what it meant to be
the object of discrimination, how it impaired the dignity of those who
suffered under it, and affected their lives adversely. It was with this
43. Id. § 9(2).
44. Id. § 9 (3).
45. Brink v. Kitshoff 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) at 22 para. 39 (S. Afr.).
46. See Minister of Fin. v. Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) at 20 para. 31
(S. Afr.); id. at 46 para. 78 (Mokgoro, J., concurring); id. at 85 para. 142 (Sachs, J.,
concurring); see also Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice
1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at 59 para. 62 (S. Aft.).
47. Law v. Canada (Minister of Emp't & Immigration), [1999] I S.C.R. 497
para. 25 (Can.) (describing equality as a "substantive concept" under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and holding therefore that unfair discrimination
"can be brought about either by a formal legislative distinction, or by a failure to
take into account the underlying differences between individuals in society.").
48. Prinsloo v. Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) at 22 para. 31 (S. Afr.).
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understanding that the Court has held that at the heart of the
prohibition of unfair discrimination "is the recognition that under our
Constitution all human beings regardless of their position in society,
must be accorded equal dignity."49 Discrimination, held the Court,
exists when there is a differentiation "based on attributes and
characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental
human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them
adversely in a comparably serious manner."50
Some critics of this approach argue that dignity has an individual
focus, and is not an appropriate standard to address the ravages of
past discrimination." But the Constitution makes clear that equality
is concerned not only with individuals, but also with "categories of
persons".52 Consistent with this, the Court has recognized "that
ongoing discrimination builds patterns of group disadvantage and
harm" and that a primary purpose of the equality right is to prevent
this, and to remedy the results of past discrimination.5 3 In its
judgment declaring the criminalisation of sodomy to be inconsistent
with our Constitution, the Constitutional Court said "it is the impact
of the discrimination on the complainant or the members of the
affected group that is the determining factor regarding the unfairness
of the discrimination."5 4 In the same case it stressed that "past unfair
discrimination frequently has ongoing negative consequences, the
continuation of which is not halted immediately when the initial
causes thereof are eliminated, and unless remedied, may continue for
a substantial time and even indefinitely", saying "like justice,
equality delayed is equality denied." 5 It thus accepts that Section 9
of the Constitution, "heralds not only equal protection of the law and
49. Hoffmann v. S. Afr. Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) at 18 para. 27 (S. Afr.).
50. Harksen v. Lane 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) at 38 para. 53 (S. Afr.).
51. See, e.g., Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt, Facing the Challenge of
Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of
Equality, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 248, 269 (1998); D.M. Davis, Equality: The
Majesty ofLegoland Jurisprudence, 116 S. AFR. L.J. 398, 408 (1999).
52. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 9(3).
53. Brink v. Kitshoff 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) at 23 para. 42 (S. Afr.).
54. Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA
6 (CC) at 20 para.19 (S. Afr.).
55. Id. at 57-58 (asserting that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights cannot
merely ensure elimination of past discrimination, but must also remedy the
ongoing negative consequences of past discrimination against categories of
individuals).
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non-discrimination but also the start of a credible and abiding
process of reparation for past exclusion, dispossession and indignity
within the discipline of our constitutional framework." 5 6
The South African Constitutional Court's approach to affirmative
action is thus quite different to that of the United States Supreme
Court. It does not see such measures in themselves, as the United
States courts do, as being invasions of the right to equality which
have to be subjected to strict scrutiny." If the measures target
persons or categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by
unfair discrimination, are designed to protect or advance such
persons, and promote the achievement of equality, they are
considered by the South African courts to be "integral to the reach"
of the Constitution's protection of equality, and to contribute to the
constitutional goal of ensuring "full and equal enjoyment of all
rights."
A different approach to that of the U.S. Supreme Court is also
evident in cases dealing with same-sex relationships. A divided U.S.
Supreme Court based its decision striking down the criminalization
of sodomy on privacy interests protected by the Bill of Rights.59
Although privacy is a right entrenched in the Constitution 6 0 and the
Constitutional Court recognized privacy interests as being involved
in the sodomy case, a unanimous court chose to base the core of its
judgment in that case on dignity and discrimination. It said that the
crime of sodomy
[P]unishes a form of sexual conduct which is identified by our broader
society with homosexuals. Its symbolic effect is to state that in the eyes of
our legal system all gay men are criminals. The stigma thus attached to a
56. Minister of Fin. v. Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) at 15 para. 25 (S.
Afr.).
57. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007) (applying strict scrutiny to a school district policy that aimed to achieve
racial integration by assigning students to schools on the basis of race, and finding
that racial balancing was an insufficient compelling state interest to justify the
policy).
58. See Minister of Fin. v. Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) at 20 para. 30
(S. Afr.) (rejecting the use of the terms "reverse discrimination" or "positive
discrimination," and adopting the term "remedial or restitutionary equality" as
"integral to the reach of our equality protection.").
59. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
60. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 14.
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significant proportion of our population is manifest. But the harm
imposed by the criminal law is far more than symbolic. As a result of the
criminal offence, gay men are at risk of arrest, prosecution and conviction
of the offence of sodomy simply because they seek to engage in sexual
conduct which is part of their experience of being human. Just as
apartheid legislation rendered the lives of couples of different racial
groups perpetually at risk, the sodomy offence builds insecurity and
vulnerability into the daily lives of gay men. There can be no doubt that
the existence of a law which punishes a form of sexual expression for gay
men degrades and devalues gay men in our broader society. As such it is a
palpable invasion of their dignity ... 61
Dealing with the issue of equality and discrimination, the
judgment states "[t]o understand 'the other' one must try, as far as is
humanly possible, to place oneself in the position of 'the other."' 62
Then, quoting from a Canadian judgment, it says
It is easy to say that everyone who is just like 'us' is entitled to equality.
Everyone finds it more difficult to say that those who are 'different' from
us in some way should have the same equality rights that we enjoy. Yet so
soon as we say any ... group is less deserving and unworthy of equal
protection and benefit of the law all minorities and all of. . . society are
demeaned. 6
[The judgment then continues]
The discriminatory prohibitions on sex between men reinforces already
existing societal prejudices and severely increases the negative effects of
such prejudices on their lives.64
[And quotes the following from a lecture by Professor Cameron,
now a Justice of the Constitutional Court]
Even when these provisions are not enforced, they reduce gay men ... to
what one author has referred to as 'unapprehended felons,' thus
entrenching stigma and encouraging discrimination in employment and
insurance and in judicial decisions about custody and other matters
61. Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA
6 (CC) at 30 para. 28 (S. Aft.).
62. Id. at 24 para. 22.
63. Id. at 25 para. 22 (citing Vriend v. Alberta, [1998 ]l S.C.R. 493, para. 69
(Can.)).
64. Id. at 25 para. 23.
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bearing on orientation. 65
This had implications beyond the issue of criminal conduct.
Proceeding on the basis that all persons have the same inherent worth
and dignity as human beings, whatever their other differences may
be, the Constitutional Court has held different forms of
discrimination against gays and lesbians to be inconsistent with the
Constitution. Most recently, it has held that the law must make
provision for same sex partners to marry.66 In the marriage case, the
Court said that this discrimination occurred at "a deeply intimate
level of human existence and relationality", and reviewing the
evidence before it along with the reasoning in the earlier cases, said:
The denial of equal dignity and worth all too quickly and insidiously
degenerated into a denial of humanity and led to inhuman treatment by
the rest of society in many other ways. This was deeply demeaning and
frequently had the cruel effect of undermining the confidence and sense of
self-worth and self-respect of lesbians and gays. [This denied them] that
which was foundational to our Constitution and the concepts of equality
and dignity, which at that point were closely intertwined, namely that all
persons have the same inherent worth and dignity as human beings,
whatever their other differences may be. 67
Section 9(3) of the Constitution includes sexual orientation as a
specified ground of prohibited discrimination. There can be little
doubt, however, in the light of the Court's reasoning that it would
have reached the same conclusion if sexual orientation had not been
referred to in section 9(3). The Constitution makes clear that the
prohibition of unfair discrimination is general, that it applies both to
direct and indirect discrimination, and that there can be grounds
other than those specified in section 9(3) which would fall within the
purview of the clause. The difference is that when discrimination on
a specified ground is established it is presumed to be unfair unless it
65. Id. (citing Edwin Cameron, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test
Case for Human Rights, 110 S. AFR. L.J. 450, 455 (1993)).
66. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 114
(S. Aft.) (holding that the failure of South African law to allow gay and lesbian
couples to marry was an unjustifiable violation of their right to dignity and
equality).
67. Id. para. 50 (citing Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of
Justice 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para. 42 (Ackermann, J.) (S. Afr.)).
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is established that it is not unfair,6 8 If an unspecified ground is relied
on, unfairness must be established by the claimant. Thus, the Court
has held that persons suffering from the HIV virus 6 9 and foreigners,70
groups not mentioned in section 9(3), are vulnerable groups entitled
to the protection of section 9 of the Constitution.
Though purpose is not irrelevant, what is of concern is the impact
that the disputed law or conduct has on the affected persons or group
of persons. The purpose of the provisions prohibiting unfair
discrimination is not to punish the discriminator. Rather, it is to
provide relief for the victims of discrimination. Conduct which may
appear to be neutral and non-discriminatory may nonetheless result
in discrimination. If it does, and if viewed objectively it impacts
unfairly on the dignity of the vulnerable group or person, then
irrespective of the intention of the law a South African court would
hold that it infringes the prohibition against unfair discrimination.'
There is another area in which dignity is relevant to a difference
between South African law and United States law, and that is in
respect of positive action demanded from the government. Unlike the
United States, where courts draw a distinction between action and
inaction in relation to the Due Process Clause,72 our Constitution
requires the state to "respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in
the Bill of Rights,"73 and this may call for positive action from the
state to protect individual rights.7 4 This is most apparent in, but not
confined to, the taking of action to give effect to the socio-economic
68. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 9(5).
69. See Hoffmann v. S. Afr. Airways 2001 (1) SA I (CC) at 29 para. 40 (S.
Afr.) (holding that South African Airways' refusal to employ the appellant because
of his HIV status "impaired his dignity and constituted unfair discrimination").
70. See Larbi-Odam v. Member of the Exec. Council for Educ. Nw. Province
1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) at 26 para. 25 (S. Afr.) (holding that an employment
regulation permitting only South African citizens to become permanent teachers at
state schools unfairly discriminated against permanent residents).
71. See City Council of Pretoria v. Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) at 34 para. 43
(S. Afr.) (holding that proof of intent to discriminate is not a threshold requirement
for claims of either direct or indirect discrimination).
72. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (concluding that a state's failure to protect its citizens from private violence
does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause).
73. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 7(2).




rights entrenched in the Constitution.
The Constitution requires the state to take reasonable legislative
and other measures within its available resources to achieve the
progressive realization of rights, such as making provision for access
to housing, health care, food, water and social security. I will call
them rights concerned with basic needs. The interpretation of these
socio-economic rights concerned with basic needs, and the emerging
jurisprudence of the court dealing with claims for their enforcement,
raise complex issues which go beyond the scope of tonight's
discussion. The Court has, however, held that dignity is foundational
to these rights, that they are justiciable, and oblige the state to take
positive action to meet the needs of those living in extreme
conditions of poverty.75
The Court has developed a quasi-administrative model for dealing
with claims for the enforcement of these rights, according to which
challenges to government programmes are reviewed for
reasonableness - the basic standard set by the relevant provisions of
the Constitution.7 6 This requires the government to respond to
assertions that its policies do not meet the constitutional standard.
When challenged, "Government must disclose what it has done to
formulate the policy: its investigation and research, the alternatives
considered, and the reasons why the option underlying the policy
was selected."7 7
These rights have both a positive and negative component. The
government must fulfill its obligations and it must also refrain from
acting in ways that undermine the constitutional rights. Dignity has
an important role in respect of both the positive and negative aspects
of the rights. This was made clear in Grootboom, an early case
dealing with the positive component of the right to have access to
housing, where in a unanimous judgment the Court held that
75. South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 34 para. 44 (S. Afr.).
76. Id.
77. See Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA I (CC) para..161 (S.
Afr.) ("The Constitution does not require government to be held to an impossible
standard of perfection. Nor does it require courts to take over the tasks that in a
democracy should properly be reserved for the democratic arms of government.
Simply put, through the institution of the courts, government can be called upon to
account to citizens for its decisions.").
1392 [26:5
DIGNITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE
The Constitution will be worth infinitely less than its paper if the
reasonableness of state action concerned with housing is determined
without regard to the fundamental value of human dignity. [The right to
have access to housing], read in the context of the Bill of Rights as a
whole, must mean that the [claimants] have a right to reasonable action by
the state in all circumstances and with particular regard to human dignity.
In short, I emphasise that human beings are required to be treated as
human beings.78
A similar approach is evident in claims concerned with the
negative component. A challenge to legislation permitting sales in
execution of immovable property for the recovery of judgment debts,
without providing adequate protection in process and substance for
the homeowners, was upheld as being inconsistent with the negative
component of the right to have access to housing. In doing so, the
Court stressed the link between housing and dignity, saying "to have
a home one calls one's own, even under the most basic
circumstances, can be a most empowering and dignifying human
experience." The impugned provision was held to be
unconstitutional because it had the potential of undermining that
experience.
Policy is not immune to judicial review. This was made clear by
the Court in a challenge to the state's policy dealing with the mother
to child transmission of the HIV virus. The policy prohibited the use
by public health care facilities of an available antiretroviral drug,
which was recommended by the World Health Organisation for
preventing transmission of the virus and had been approved by the
South African Medical Research Council for such purposes. The
Constitutional Court rejected an argument that the policy was beyond
the scrutiny of the Court," holding that
A dispute concerning socio-economic rights is ... likely to require a court
to evaluate state policy and to give judgment on whether or not it is
consistent with the Constitution. If it finds that policy is inconsistent with
the Constitution it is obliged in terms of [the Constitution] to make a
78. See South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 61 para. 83 (S.
Aft.).
79. Jaftha v. Schoeman 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) at para. 39 (S. Afr.).
80. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at
para. 98-100 (S. Afr.).
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declaration to that effect.81
The Court went on to hold that reasonable measures within
available resources had not been taken by the state to provide access
to necessary health care. The reason: "A potentially lifesaving drug
was on offer and ... it could have been administered within the
available resources of the state without any known harm to mother or
child."8 2
There are also related socioeconomic rights concerned with
children, land, education and the environment that may require
positive action by the state, which would call for a somewhat
different approach because of the difference in language of the
relevant texts. 83 Dignity is relevant here too. It is common, however,
for the Court to examine claims for infringement of entrenched rights
through the lens of dignity. For instance, it has placed weight on the
right to human dignity in holding that capital punishment8 4 and
corporal punishment" are inconsistent with section 12 of the
Constitution, which recognizes the right of everyone "not to be
treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way." The
Court has also held that the right to vote of every citizen is "a badge
of dignity and personhood; quite literally, it says that everybody
counts" 6 and thus a general exclusion of all convicted prisoners from
the right to vote is inconsistent with the Constitution." Dignity is a
value held to be relevant to the right to a fair trial," the rights of
81. Id. at 60 para. 101.
82. Id. at 48 para. 80.
83. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 §§ 24-25, 28-29.
84. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at paras. 57-62 (S. Afr.).
85. See State v. Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) at paras. 89-91 (S. Afr.)
(holding that the punishment of whipping for juvenile offenders violates the right
to dignity as enshrined in the constitution and constitutes cruel, unusual and
degrading punishment); see also Christian Educ. S. Africa v. Minister of Educ.
1999 (2) SA 83 (CC) at paras. 50-52 (S. Afr.) (upholding a national law banning
corporal punishment in schools).
86. August v. Electoral Comm'n 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 23 para. 17 (S. Afr.).
87. Minister of Home Affairs v. Nat'l Inst. for Crime Prevention & the Re-
Integration of Offenders 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) at 42 para. 80 (S. Afr.) (ordering
the Electoral Commission to provide all prisoners, who are entitled to vote, with a
reasonable opportunity to register and vote); see also August v. Electoral Comm'n
1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 23 para. 17 (S. Afr.).
88. State v. Jaipal 2005 (4) SA 581 (CC) at 14 para. 26 (S. Afr.) (holding that
the right to a fair trial is essential in a society which is based on "the rights to
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refugees,9 an is relevant to matters of status and public policy.90
These examples can be multiplied by searching through the reported
judgments of the Constitutional Court.
In a speech made at Georgetown after almost thirty years of
service as a Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan talked
about the importance of human dignity for constitutional
adjudication. He said
I do not mean to suggest that we have in the last quarter-century achieved
a comprehensive definition of the constitutional ideal of human
dignity.... if the interaction of this Justice and the constitutional text
over the years confirms any single proposition, it is that the demands of
human dignity will never cease to evolve.91
We are people of our times. As societies evolve we gain a better
understanding of the causes of discrimination and exclusion, and
how this is expressed and experienced. Under the South African
Constitution, dignity is a value asserted to "invest in our democracy
respect for the intrinsic worth of all human beings." 92 It is, as the
Court has held, a value that informs the interpretation of many,
possibly all, other rights.93 As the Court's jurisprudence develops,
human dignity and to the freedom of security of the person."); see also State v.
Dzukuda 2000 (4) SA 1078 (CC) at 13 para. 11 (S. Afr.).
89. Union of Refugee Women v. Dir.: Private Sec. Indus. Regulatory Auth.
2007 (4) BCLR 339 (CC) at 70 para. 135 (S. Afr.) (outlining the rights of refugees
under the Convention, which include issuing refugees with identity papers and
prohibiting discrimination against refugees on the basis of race, religion, or
country of origin).
90. Hassam v. Jacobs NO 2009 (11) BCLR 1148 (CC) at 15 para. 25 (S. Afr.)
(declaring certain provisions of South Africa's Intestate Succession law to be
unconstitutional in so far as these provisions discriminate against spouses in
traditional Muslim marriages. Nkabinde J. reasoned that the Court must have due
regard for the diversity of modem society and emphasized that "the content of
public policy must now be determined with reference to the founding values
underlying our constitutional democracy, including human dignity and equality, in
contrast to the rigidly exclusive approach that was based on the values and beliefs
of a limited sector of society" in the past).
91. See Wermiel, supra note 23, at 239 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L.
REv. 433 (1986)).
92. Dawood v. Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) at 39 para. 35
(S. Afr.).
93. Id. at 39 n.50 (citing Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of
Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) para. 120 (Sachs, J., concurring) (S. Afr.) ("It will be
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which must happen in the years to come, it will surely bear testimony
to Justice Brennan's vision that "the demands of human dignity will
never cease to evolve."9 4
PROFESSOR MICHELMAN: Joining in this event with Chief
Justice Chaskalson and Professor Schwartz is a special pleasure for
me, for reasons that I will briefly go into before I sit down. Thanks to
the Dean for inviting me and to all who helped to arrange this event.
In his written paper, the Chief Justice makes reference to dignity
skeptics (as I will call them), commentators for whom appeals to
human dignity in constitutional adjudication are not only a
distraction but are also potentially troublesome, possibly getting in
the way of what the critics envision as the best adjudicative
outcomes. I had thought to use my time at the podium to talk
somewhat broadly about dignity skepticism and some issues it raises.
But I decided to throw away that grand script while listening to Chief
Justice Chaskalson, and rather to treat the question a bit more
concretely.
I will focus on a particular context, one in which a certain highly
plausible notion of the human dignity to be recognized and protected
by constitutional law might easily be thought to get in the way of
best adjudicative outcomes. The context that I have in mind is that of
a directly or indirectly race-based (race-coded, race-correlated) rule
or policy, undertaken in the pursuit of "the achievement of
equality"-a commitment that comes just on the heels of "human
dignity" at the head of the South African Constitution's list of its
founding values and is then followed up closely by the value of
"non-racialism." 95
In South Africa, an equal and nonracial society is unlikely to be
achieved within any number of eons without a good deal of state
action of the sort I have just mentioned. That would seem pretty
much a given. I soon will read to you a few lines, aimed at reminding
you about a certain kind of dignity problem that arises in such a
setting. I'll then go on to describe how the South African
noted that the motif which links and unites equality and privacy, and which,
indeed, runs right through the protections offered by the Bill of Rights, is
dignity.")).
94. Wermiel, supra note 23 at 239.
95. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 1.
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Constitutional Court has worked its way through this problem. And I
will ask you to think comparatively about the United States and
whether the South African solution is one that could conceivably
work here with us.
Here, then, is a passage from Justice Lewis Powell's decisive
opinion for the Supreme Court in the famous Bakke case:
All state imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and benefits on
the basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the
individuals burdened . ... These individuals are likely to find little
comfort in the notion that the deprivation they are asked to endure is
merely the price of membership in the dominant majority and that its
imposition is inspired by the supposedly benign purpose of aiding others.
One should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness of, and the
perception of mistreatment that accompanies, a system of allocating them
privileges on the basis of skin color and ethnic origin. 96
Justice Powell did not use the term human dignity, but he might
have. For there is an easily recognized, widely understood sense of
the notion of human dignity-one that is a natural for consideration
in constitutional law-that is plainly conveyed by this passage. I
mean dignity understood as a person's sense of standing in society,
secure against maltreatment or disadvantage owing to arbitrary or
prejudicial hostility, or deprecation from others including decision-
makers. For Justice Powell, it seems human dignity in that important
sense is placed at risk by each instance of public racial classifying,
no matter how allegedly benign a purpose.
With Justice Powell's concern in mind, I now introduce a South
African case called City Council of Pretoria v. Walker." The facts of
the Walker case are a bit complex and raise a number of issues. For
now, it is enough to say that the case involved a set of policies
adopted by the city council of a newly reorganized city of Pretoria
encompassing both an "old Pretoria" area occupied almost
exclusively by economically well-off white residents and two former
black township areas occupied almost exclusively by people who
were black and economically stressed. The plain, certain, and
doubtless intended effect of these policies was to require residents of
96. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978) (citations
omitted).
97. 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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old Pretoria to pay more heavily for consumption of city-supplied
utility services than residents in the poverty-stricken former
townships. Over a transitional period of uncertain duration, the latter
were to get a break not only in the unit prices charged to them but in
the form of much milder treatment in case of nonpayment.
As adopted by the city council, these policies were cast in terms of
which part of the new city you lived in, not in terms of anyone's
racial identity. The break went to residents of areas that happened to
be almost 100% black-occupied in comparison with residents of
areas that happened to be almost 100% white-occupied-not, of
course, by chance accident but rather by force of historical apartheid.
So we have here a case of express discrimination not by race but by
area of residence, but also a rather dramatic instance of what U.S.
doctrine sometimes calls "de facto" race-based discrimination.
The Constitutional Court had to decide whether the preference in
favor of the residents of the former townships amounted to
prohibited "unfair discrimination" on a racial ground, prohibited by
Section Nine of the Constitution. Those who know the U.S. case of
Gomillion v. Lightfoot9 8 might find some echoes here. But the South
African rules are different from those that governed in Gomillion,
and they would not require any inference of specific intent to burden
whites as whites or benefit blacks as blacks in order to establish a
constitutional violation. As Arthur Chaskalson has explained, the
equality clause in South Africa's Constitution is worded so as to
cover "indirect" as well as "direct" discrimination on a racial ground,
and Walker looks like a clear case of what the text almost certainly
must mean by "indirect" race-based discrimination. The Constitution
does not, however, make unconstitutional all direct and indirect
racial discrimination, but only that which is found "unfair." And as
Chief Justice Chaskalson also has explained, the Constitutional Court
has developed a body of doctrine by which the test of unfairness-
the test that would make the difference between permissible and non-
permissible discrimination-is an impact-based test. The question
ultimately has to be whether the challenged policy would affect the
complaining party by impairing his or her dignity or in some
equivalently serious way.
98. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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So the question facing the Court in the Walker case was whether
Mr. Walker, the white resident of old Pretoria, was suffering or was
in danger of suffering an impairment of his dignity in consequence of
the de facto race-based classification. The opinion for the Court's
majority was prepared by Justice Pius Langa, who was at that time
the Court's Deputy President and would later, after Arthur
Chaskalson's retirement, become the Chief Justice. And in the one
branch of the case where the majority found unconstitutional
unfairness, it did find the kind of impairment of dignity with which
the South African Constitution is concerned. Justice Langa started by
acknowledging that Walker belongs to a group (that is, the group of
white residents of old Pretoria) that had not "been disadvantaged by
the racial policies and practices of the past."99 Moreover, Walker's
group, having "been benefited from rather than adversely affected by
the discrimination of the past," is not currently disadvantaged or
vulnerable "in an economic sense." 00
But what if we look past the "economic sense" of current
disadvantage? Mr. Walker does unquestionably, in the new South
Africa, belong to "a racial voting minority" that could "in a political
sense be regarded as a vulnerable minority." And it is "precisely
individuals who are members of such minorities who are vulnerable
to discriminatory treatment and who in a very special sense must
look to the bill of rights for protection." 01
Now think about Justice Powell as I read you a further passage
from Justice Langa's opinion.
No members of a racial group should be made to feel that they are not
deserving of 'equal concern, respect, and consideration,' and that the law
is likely to be used against them more harshly than others who belong to
other race groups. That is the grievance that the respondent has. . . . The
impact of such a policy on the respondent and other persons similarly
placed, viewed objectively ... would in my view have affected them in a
manner which is at least comparably serious to an invasion of their
dignity. 102
Might that have been Justice Powell speaking about Allen Bakke?
99. Walker, 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) at para. 47 (S. Afr.).
100. Id.
101. Id. Para. 48.
102. Id. para. 81.
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But think, now, about the possible ramifications of such a dignity-
centered objection to such an indirectly race-coded policy in view of
South Africa's current situation. Think about how gravely it might
get in the way of all kinds of transformation-minded policies: say
more generous state aid to schools in impoverished areas that are
overwhelmingly black-inhabited as compared with schools in
economically advantaged areas that are overwhelmingly white-
attended, and go on from there.
This problem of dignity potentially getting in the way of the social
transformation to which the Constitution is also committed was very
much on the mind of Justice Albie Sachs, who submitted a separate
judgment in the Walker case. An "understandable sense of
unfairness," wrote Justice Sachs, "cannot be separated from the
purpose for which the measure was taken." 03 The more "manifestly
justifiable the public purpose in the light of the objectives of the
Constitution, the less scope for a legitimate feeling of having been
badly done by."1 04
Now, what is Justice Sachs saying there? He is saying that there is
or there should be no impairment of Mr. Walker's dignity because
this is, after all, Mr. Walker's Constitution as much as anyone else's.
It is a social-transformative project to which he, as a South African
citizen, is presumably committed along with all the others. What is
fair or unfair, Justice Sachs continued, must be considered not from
the standpoint of the white resident of old Pretoria or the black
resident of a former township, but "simultaneously from the diverse
points of view of all the inhabitants of the whole, [while] bearing in
mind the values enshrined in the Constitution."o10 Yes, all are
"entitled to equal respect," and so we must pay Mr. Walker the
respect that is his due by allowing him the dignity of a citizen,
committed to his country's project, declared by its Constitution, of
the achievement of equality and a nonracial society and to doing
what it takes to get from here to there. That is what I take away from
the judgment of Justice Sachs in the Walker case. But I could show
you, too, how Sachs's judgment in this respect really speaks for the
full Constitutional Court, in the Walker case and elsewhere.
103. Id. para. 129.
104. Id.
105. Id. para. 130.
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You might think of Justice Harry Blackmun in Bakke: "In order to
get beyond racism we must take race into account. There is no other
way."l 0 6 And then of Chief Justice John Roberts in Parents Involved:
"The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.""o" We see there a conflict of
opinions about how possibly to get from here to there, and that
conflict occurs in South Africa, too. As a possible difference, though,
between the two scenes, consider that perhaps the notion of human
dignity prevailing in our courts takes sides on the how-to-get-there
disagreement (remember Justice Powell), while the notion of human
dignity prevailing in the Constitutional Court of South Africa awaits
public, communal resolution of that disagreement before picking a
side to take. If so, then a dignity-centered constitutional
jurisprudence could appear troublesome to transformation-minded
Americans in a way that would not apply in South Africa.
According to the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, that
country's Basic Law proceeds from an "image of man" (perhaps
better translated as "image of humankind") that deeply informs the
Basic Law's conception of human dignity. The image of man in the
Basic Law "is not that of an isolated, sovereign individual; rather, the
Basic Law has decided in favor of a relationship between individual
and community in the sense of a person's dependence on and
commitment to the community, without infringing upon a person's
individual value.""
Rather similar, perhaps, is the South African Constitution's image
of humankind and correspondingly of human dignity: humankind not
as a collection of independent souls each trying to find his or her
own way through life, but of individuals who are also citizens, who
understand themselves to be associates in a commonly adopted civic
project. Accordingly, to treat a person with regard for his or her
dignity is to treat him or her as a person and citizen thus committed.
It speaks for a South African constitutional doctrine of what we
might term "objective dignity."
106. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978).
107. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
748 (2007).
108. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July
20, 1954, 4 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 7
(15-16) 1954 (Ger.) (Investment Aid Case, I).
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Might such a notion possibly catch on here? Think again about
Justice Powell: "All state-imposed classifications that rearrange
burdens and benefits on the basis of race are likely to be viewed with
deep resentment by the individuals burdened." 09 These individuals
"are likely to find little comfort in the notion that the deprivation
they are asked to endure is merely the price of membership in the
dominant majority. . . ."110 Perhaps that is simply the truth about the
American as opposed to the South African way, ours as opposed to
their image of humankind. If so, then, to repeat, dignity skepticism
must stand on a different footing here than it does there.
There is one matter of human dignity in regard to which I am no
kind of a skeptic, and that has to do with Arthur Chaskalson's life
and career and their representation of human dignity and what
philosophers sometimes call the humanity in the person.
"Representation" in any sense you like. I have in mind Arthur's
career as an advocate defending, at considerable risk to self, those
oppressed and endangered by the system of apartheid law. I have in
mind the man who became an architect of the Constitution whose
meaning and content he described to us, and then the man whose
captaincy of the brave new Constitutional Court combined great
legal doctrinal acuity with pragmatic wisdom and diplomacy-
including both a sense of when to act and when to wait, and a gift for
seeing how to combine the sometimes differing perceptions and
priorities of members of the Court into judgments speaking for them
all-to produce in a short space of time a world-class body of
constitutional jurisprudence. So, having begun these remarks by
thanking the Dean for having me here, I close them by thanking
Arthur Chaskalson for his life's work of contribution to the
advancement of the cause of human dignity.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: I believe that there have been four
great chief justices in the postwar period: our own Chief Justice Earl
Warren, President Aharon Barak of Israel, President Laszlo Solyom
of Hungary and Chief Justice Chaskalson. Even in this stellar group
Chief Justice Chaskalson stands out, for he is the only one who spent
years as a lawyer fighting for human rights, courageously
confronting a brutal regime and enduring many setbacks. What
109. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294 n.34.
110. Id.
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Arthur has therefore brought to those young people fortunate enough
to be his students, and indeed to all of us, is a sense of realism, a
direct experience of what it takes to be in the forefront of those
fighting for human rights on a daily basis.
He has brought that same realistic idealism to his court. To read a
truly great decision, read Arthur's opinion in the capital punishment
case, including the footnotes."' Not only does he do a careful and
thorough analysis of scores of capital punishment cases from courts
throughout the world, but most importantly he sets out the terrible
difficulties that defendants face in death penalty cases, where there is
always a shortage of competent defense counsel and very few of the
other necessary resources. This is realism that I am sad to say is
rarely seen in the capital punishment opinions in our Supreme Court.
It is this realistic idealism that has made the South African
Constitutional Court one of the leading courts in the world, even
though it is a very young tribunal.
My talk will consist largely of footnotes to Arthur's discussion of
dignity. Arthur observed that the respect for human dignity is
reflected in an insistence on equality and freedom from
discrimination. Except for Justice William Brennan, however,
dignity has not been a central element in the jurisprudence of our
Supreme Court. In American constitutional jurisprudence, and
indeed in our country in general, there has been little respect for true
equality except occasionally and for brief periods of time.
The great triad of values of the French Revolution is liberty,
equality, and fraternity. As a nation and as a society under the rule of
law, we have been quite good on liberty, not very good at equality,
and quite weak on fraternity, insofar as that means concern for our
fellow human beings when they are in trouble. This is not new.
Although our founding document, the Declaration of Independence,
opened with the revolutionary pronouncement that "all men are
created equal," those who wrote it and those who signed it were
aware that this did not reflect the way Americans lived or even
wanted to live. We were a slave society with one fifth of our people
in bondage. Many signers of the Declaration of Independence,
including Northerners like Robert Livingston of New York and John
111. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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Hancock of Massachusetts, were slaveholders. In 1770, 40% of New
York City households owned slaves, and 9% of the people in
Philadelphia were slaves. Women were certainly not equal to men in
that society. Everyone knew this, and right from the very beginning,
the assertion that "all men are created equal" was undermined by the
reality of American life.
Unlike the Declaration, our original Constitution (which for these
purposes includes the Bill of Rights, since it was part of the original
understanding) contains no reference at all to equality. There could
not be, for the Southern states, particularly South Carolina and
Georgia, would not have allowed it. Instead, the slave trade was
protected until 1808; there was a provision for a fugitive slave law,
and of course there was the infamous three-fifths clause which
insured Southern dominance of American politics up to the Civil
War. Thus, right from the beginning we had a Constitution that not
only showed no concern for equality but actually incorporated
inequality in its most brutal form.
This was followed seventy years later by the infamous Dred
Scott"l2 decision, which ensured that black people could never be
equal to whites, for it held that they could never be citizens. The
Civil War Amendments overturned that decision and did try to
promote true equality but failed to do so, either for black people or
for women. When Reconstruction ended in 1877, black people and
women were denied the equal protection of the laws despite the clear
language of the Fourteenth Amendment. And, despite the Fifteenth
Amendment, black people and women still could not vote, either
legally with respect to women, or in practice with respect to the
former slaves.
In his discussion today, Arthur pointed out that there is no
significant difference between action and inaction when it comes to
protection for human rights and human dignity. Of course, he is
absolutely right. A failure to prevent discrimination can be as
harmful as active discrimination. American law, however, has
refused to recognize that. As recently as 2000, in a case involving the
states' failure to protect women from violence, our Supreme Court
ruled that the Constitution forbids only positive action against human
112. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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rights and not failures to act by state officials. Yet the literal meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment that no state may "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" clearly
condemns the failure to provide protection for those who are entitled
to it under the law, a failure to act. Indeed, the amendment was
aimed in part at the refusal of Southern law enforcement officials to
protect the freedmen against white violence.
In sum, the end of Reconstruction saw the end of efforts to achieve
equality in this country. Instead, the nation's racism reasserted itself,
North and South. In 1890, there was a half-hearted effort in Congress
to protect black voting rights in the South. Southern senators
filibustered and the effort failed. In 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson"' the
Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to racial oppression when it
approved the doctrine of "separate but equal." Here again, and I
know no other word for it, the hypocrisy that has been a constant of
American constitutional law where equality is concerned, asserted
itself. The justices of the Supreme Court, many of them Northerners,
knew that separation really meant subordination and inequality.
Then, in the early 1900s, many Southern states adopted constitutions
that were openly designed to deny black people any opportunity to
vote. American democracy was thereby profoundly compromised,
because if human dignity means anything, it is that each citizen is
entitled to an equal voice in how the citizenry governs itself.
All this meant that there would be many more decades of human
misery as black people were denied not only the vote but economic
and every other kind of fair treatment. They risked physical violence,
economic retaliation and even death if they tried to assert their right
to be treated as equal human beings.
During the first half of the twentieth century it can fairly be said
that most of the country, including its legal system, ignored the
nation's constitutional commitment to equal treatment for all. After
World War II, things began to change. At first it looked as if very
little had been altered. Black soldiers who returned to their Southern
homes found discrimination and even violence if they tried to assert
the rights they had fought and died for. But this time was different.
Inspired in part by the Brownll4 decision in 1954 and by great leaders
113. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
114. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
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like Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Rosa Parks, black people first
and then women, gays, and others began to assert their rights to equal
treatment and human dignity. Although great social and economic
changes resulted, the moment didn't last long. One of the first major
blows came in 1976, when the Supreme Court, reversing all of the
Courts of Appeals that have dealt with the issue, insisted that for
there to be a constitutional violation discriminatory intent by a
particular actor or group of actors was required."' What the Court
implied-which has been a central feature of American
constitutional law-is that discrimination is a bad thing done by
nasty individuals. That's true, but it completely ignores the way
racism has penetrated all of our institutions. Even if one cannot find
an individual perpetrator-they still exist but they are far more
sophisticated today and harder to pin down-racism is embedded in
the educational system, the employment system, and in many other
contexts and institutions. Statutes have remedied this in part, but
these have been interpreted much too narrowly in recent years to be
truly effective as the federal courts have become increasingly
conservative. As a result, the fight for human dignity, particularly for
Black and Hispanic people, has suffered setbacks again and again.
I will conclude with what seems to me among the worst of all
examples of the insensitivity and hypocrisy that pervades our courts'
dealing with America's continuing inequalities. This is something
that both Arthur and Frank touched upon: the current judicial
insistence on colorblindness. Colorblindness, as a constitutional
norm for dealing with our legacy of racism, is a superficially
attractive piece of deception. It is, in fact, a strategy for undermining
efforts to undo the vestiges of America's greatest historical evil.
There is a profound moral difference between public and private
action to help those in need and public and private action to hurt
them. It is the difference between good and evil. Yet today's
conservative justices and judges insist on equating the two. The kind
of blindness that Frank quoted from Chief Justice Roberts' opinion in
the Seattle voluntary school integration case'6-using Thurgood
Marshall's own words in the Brown argument to block a modest
115. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 224 (1976).
116. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
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effort to integrate black and white schoolchildren, something that
Justice Marshall fought for his entire life-is one of the most
shameful utterances by a Supreme Court justice in recent memory; it
ranks with the approval of "separate but equal" in Plessy.
So this is where we are today. We have adopted potentially strong
amendments to promote equality and human dignity, and there have
been many advances in our constitutional jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, we are not likely to have many more such advances
soon. I don't think that the doctrines and principles developed by
Chief Justice Chaskalson and by the South African Constitutional
Court under his leadership will have much influence on our country,
at least not in the foreseeable future. I am afraid that we are not yet
ready to follow the path toward human dignity blazed so
courageously and brilliantly by Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson.
* *
